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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“DEAD COPIES” UNDER THE JAPANESE UNFAIR COMPETITION
PREVENTION ACT: THE NEW MORAL RIGHT
KENNETH L. PORT*

INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Japanese legislature, or Diet, amended the Unfair Competition
Prevention Act (UCPA) to prevent the slavish copying (moho) of another’s
product configuration (shohinno keitai) regardless of registration, regardless of
notice of any kind, regardless of whether the configuration was distinctive in
any way, and regardless of whether any consumer was confused or deceived.1
* Professor of Law and Director of Intellectual Property Studies, William Mitchell College of
Law. J.D., University of Wisconsin. I am deeply indebted to Laurie Sheen (WMCL ‘07) and
Toshiya Kaneko (University of Tokyo) for their assistance with this article. This article was
researched while I was a Foreign Research Fellow at the Tokyo University Business Law Center
under the gracious auspices of Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama.
1. Fuseikyoso Boshiho [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 47 of 1993,
translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–96 (2005) [hereinafter UCPA]. In this paper, I
refer to Article 2-1-3 of the amended UCPA as “the Dead Copy Statute.” Although the original
UCPA predated World War II, the original UCPA largely addressed counterfeit goods. See
Fuseikyoso Boshiho [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 14 of 1934. During the
Occupation of Japan, General Head Quarters (GHQ) had a large influence on shaping Japanese
unfair competition policy. See Tetsuo Tomita, Fuseikyosoboshiho Seiteikankeishiryo [Documents
on the Legislative Process of Unfair Competition Law], 1994/3 Patent Studies 50 (translated by
author). In fact, even the Preamble of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which ultimately ended
the Occupation of Japan, noted the importance of conforming to international standards: “. . . in
public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices.”
Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3.3 U.S.T. 3169, 3171 (1952).
Even before the San Francisco Peace Treaty but at the urging of GHQ, Japan amended
the UCPA in significant ways. CHIKUJO KAISETSU FUSEIKYOSOBOSHIHO [CLAUSE BY CLAUSE
EXPLANATION OF THE UCPA] 5–7 (METI Intell. Prop. Policy Comm. eds., 2005) (translated by
author). For instance, in order to obtain an injunction, a subjective intent to engage in unfair
competition would no longer be a requirement. Id. This was done because even though there
were multiple examples of objective intent to cause unfair competition, it was impossible to prove
that someone subjectively intended to engage in unfair competition. Id. Additionally, in order to
obtain an injunction, the prior Act required that there be “an injured party.” Id. This was
changed to focus on the specific and likely conduct, as well as the likely resulting harm. Id.
Also, “exportation” was added to each specific offense. Id. The amendments also made
requirements for showing a false place of origin simpler. Id. The amendments made actionable
conduct that caused people to be deceived as to a goods’ source. Id. Next, the amendments made
93
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The Japanese refer to the concept of slavish imitation as “dead copies.” This
monopoly grant lasts for three years from the date the product is first sold.2
Before 1993, product configurations were protected either under the old
UCPA or the Civil Code. Although there were numerous cases that
successfully claimed rights under the old UCPA, before a configuration could
be protected under the old law, it had to be a “well-known” appellation of a
source.3 It was perceived that if Japan was going to improve its economic
condition, it needed to become an “intellectual property society.”4
actionable deceptive practices regarding a product’s quality, content, or volume. Id. The
amendments also strengthened the right to demand a restoration of trust in the marketplace. Id.
Other provisions were also added. Id.
Changes to the UCPA are well-documented. See generally id. 8–17. In 1953 the UCPA
was amended to bring Japan in compliance with the Madrid Protocol, which prevented false or
misleading designations of origin. Id. In 1965 the UCPA was amended to bring Japan in
compliance with the Paris Convention and the Treaty of London. Id. In 1975 the UCPA was
amended to make Japan compliant with the Stockholm Amendments to the Paris Convention. Id.
In 1990 the UCPA was amended to bring Japan into compliance with what ultimately became
known as the TRIPs Agreement. Id. In the twelve years since the 1993 amendments, the UCPA
has been amended nine times. Id. In context, this is not that surprising a fact; the U.S. Copyright
statute has been amended 25 times in the last 30 years. See JULIE COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN
A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 36 (2006). The common wisdom is that these changes were
required to protect configurations that may ultimately be registered under the Design Law.
However, in 1993 Design Law registration required three years. It now takes roughly one year.
Furthermore, academics as well as practitioners opine that there have not yet been major cases
where large amounts of damages have been awarded under Article 2-1-3. As such, it has not yet
caught the fancy of Japanese academics or practitioners.
2. See infra Part V.B.
3. Noriichi Okaguchi, Shohinkeitaimoho [Slavish Imitation of Product Configuration], in
CHITEKIZAISANKANKEISOSHOHO [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RELATED LITIGATION] 457 (Hon.
Toshiaki Makino & Hon. Toshiaki Iimura, eds., 2004) (discussing protection of product
configuration under the pre-1993 UCPA) (translated by author). Even after 1993, some elect to
protect product configurations using Article 2-1-1, which requires a showing that the
configuration is an appellation of source, that the configuration is well-known, and that
purchasers are confused. See, e.g., Miyama Kogyo, K.K. v. Flex System, K.K., 1891 HANREI
JIHO 147 (Tokyo D. Ct., Feb. 15, 2005) (translated by author).
4. This societal wide movement has even been the impetus for the creation of Centers at
rather unlikely universities. For example, Hiroshima University has created the “Intellectual
Property Society Creativity Center.”
See Hiroshima University, http://home.hiroshimau.ac.jp/chizai/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (translated by author). Interestingly, though, they
translate this into English as merely the “Intellectual Property Center.” Present Prime Minister
Koizumi has been quoted in various contexts as seeking to create a nation “founded on
intellectual property.” See, e.g., Mayumi Negishi, Japan Gets Intellectual on Property Rights,
JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/
nb20041208a1.htm. However, at least in the minds of the Tokyo District Court, this apparently
has not yet been successful. See Torada v. Shimoda, 1913 HANREI JIHO 146 (Tokyo D. Ct., June
21, 2005) (translated by author). In Torada, the Tokyo District Court held that the trademark IP
FIRM was not appropriate for registration because consumers would not necessarily know what
“IP” meant. Id. at 153–54. The court reasoned that IP could stand for “Internet Protocol” or
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Accordingly, a specific statutory prohibition of slavish imitation was included
in the amendment.
Article 709 of the Civil Code provides yet another way to protect product
configurations.5 Article 709 essentially makes the infringement of any general
right a tort.6 In a pivotal case that became a true rallying point for advocates of
the cause, the defendant slavishly imitated the plaintiff’s furniture.7 Even
though the plaintiff prevailed and damages were awarded, the court held that
the Civil Code did not authorize it to issue an injunction.8 Injunctions are not
available under the general provisions of the Japanese Civil Code; monetary
damages are the appropriate remedy. Unless there is a specific provision
authorizing injunctions, they are not appropriate under the Civil Code.9 Since
most plaintiffs in dead copy cases only wanted an injunction and not damages,
it became apparent that a large disconnect existed between what manufacturers
wanted and what the Civil Code permitted.10
In Japan, this protection has become known as protecting a product from
“dead copies.” Dead copy protection in Japan goes too far. It would be
unconstitutional if done in the United States.11 The notion relied upon by
Japanese drafters, that international harmonization makes this type of
protection necessary, is simply incorrect. No such specific corollary protection
“Inkjet Printer.” Id. Therefore, the mark did not identify for consumers that the services come
from a specific source. Id.
5. Minpō [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709, translated in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SER.
No. 2100–01 (2005) (stating that one who either intentionally or negligently damages the rights
protected by law of another shall be responsible for those damages).
6. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Fernandes, K.K., 1719 HANREI JIHO 122 (Tokyo High Ct., Feb.
24, 2000) (“Making dead copies of another’s product configuration is prohibited by the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law. If such conduct exceeds the scope of fair competition, it will be
adjudicated to be a tort.”) (translated by author).
7. Dai Nippon Printing, K.K. v. Takebayashi Mfg., K.K., 1418 HANREI JIHO 120 (Tokyo
High Ct., Dec. 17, 1991) (translated by author).
8. TETSUYA WATANABE ET AL., FUSEIKYOSOBOSHIHO NO MINAOSHI NO HOKO [TRENDS
IN REVISING THE UCPA] 143 (Comm. on Intell. Prop., Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
eds., 1994) (translated by author).
9. Zentaro Kitagawa, 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, XIII Business Liability § 1.07[2][a]
(1996) (“Relief other than money is permissible . . . only where a special rule has so provided.”).
10. Similarly, in another very recent case, Yomiuri Newspaper, the court found a violation of
Article 709 of the Civil Code and ordered damages to be paid to a major Japanese newspaper, but
found also that an injunction is improper under the Civil Code when the defendant copied its
headlines and provided links to the articles. Yomirui Newspaper v. Digital Alliance (Intellectual
Property High Court, Oct. 6, 2005) (translated by author), available at http://legal.lexisnexis.jp/
jp/lngateway.dll?f=templates&fn=defaultHome_JP.htm&vid=Japan:10.1048/Enu. Even though a
Dead Copy Statute violation was alleged, the court based its judgment on Article 709 of the Civil
Code. Id. at 11–15; see also, Minpō [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709, translated in 2
EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 2100–01 (2005). The court did find that the articles constituted a
“product configuration,” but did not find them slavishly imitated. Yomiuri Newspaper, at 12.
11. See infra notes 33–44 and accompanying text.
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exists in other jurisdictions and, most certainly, no international treaty requires
protection to the extent enjoyed in Japan. Dead copy protection, in fact, makes
international harmonization on this point impossible because dead copy
protection in the United States would be impossible, and goes much further
than other Civil Law jurisdictions have gone.12
By granting an arbitrary, monopolistic three-year window of protection
against the copying of product configurations, the Japanese extend an
undeserved, statutory monopoly to holders of such product configurations.
This will ultimately chill new product development and negatively affect the
fragile Japanese economy. In essence, the dead copy provision of the UCPA
strikes another blow to the public domain,13 and protects sweat of the brow, a
justification for intellectual property that has long been considered spurious at
best.14 In the end, the Dead Copy Statute acts like a new moral right where
strict liability attaches.

12. See infra notes 45–50.
13. The discussion in the United States about the balance between intellectual property
protection, on one hand, versus the protection of the public domain, on the other, is rich and
fascinating. See, e.g., Maya Alexandri, The International News Quasi-Property Paradigm and
Trademark Incontestability, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 303 (2000); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors
and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain, 18 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 1, 5–34 (1994); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121
(1999); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1331 (2004); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual
Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431 (2004); Jane C.
Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademark Law, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 263 (2004); Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986
WIS. L. REV. 429 (1986); Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints
on the Government’s Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J.
1783 (2002); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Christine Nickles,
The Conflicts Between Intellectual Property Protections when a Character Enters the Public
Domain, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 133 (1999); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public
Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2002); Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public
Domain in Intellectual Property Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2003); Simone A.
Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for “Famous” Trademarks: Anti Competitive
“Monopoly” or Earned “Property” Right?, 47 FLA. L. REV. 653 (1995); Kurt M. Saunders, A
Crusade in the Public Domain: The Dastar Decision, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 161
(2004); Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1999);
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, National Treatment, National Interest and the Public Domain, 1 U.
OTTOWA L. & TECH. J. 23 (2003); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain (2003), http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/boyle.pdf (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006). All of these authors find the expansion of intellectual property rights
troublesome because of their interference with the public domain. To summarize all of these
articles, a rich and free public domain may be better for a growing economy than an economy
with distinct monopolies carved out.
14. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991).
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I. THE STATUTE
The statute itself is quite simple and straightforward. The current version
of Article 2-1-3 of the UCPA states that:
Selling, distributing, exporting or importing goods which imitate the product
configuration of another (excluding functional configurations) [shall constitute
15
an act of unfair competition].

Article 19-1-5 of the UCPA places a three-year restriction on the assertion
of the dead copy right calculated from the date of first sale of the good in
Japan.16 That is, the statute contemplates prohibiting another from using a
product configuration for a period of three years. This three-year period is,
essentially, a head start that the first user of a product configuration receives as
a statutory gift.
Although the Japanese Diet elected to use banal, generic terms that do not
provide much direction at all, the 2005 amendments to the UCPA codified
definitions of both “product configuration” (shohinnokeitai) and “imitation”
(moho) as follows:
The term “product configuration” in this Act shall mean the shape of a good or
the shape of the good combined with the design, color, luster or mass, the
17
distinctiveness of which is perceptible by a consumer through normal use.
The term “imitation” in this Act shall mean creating a product configuration
18
which depends upon and is essentially identical to that configuration.

For the first time, functional configurations are expressly excluded from
protection. However, functionality has been defined using competitive need
There is still no
utilitarianism instead of normative functionality.19
requirement that the product configuration be well-known or famous,20 and no
requirement that any third party had prior notice of this claim whatsoever.
15. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, amended by Law No. 87 of 2005, art. 2-1-3 (translated by
author).
16. Id. The statute actually reads “nihon kokunai ni oite,” which means “within Japan.” Id.
(translated by author). That is, it appears to mean that one could make substantial sales of a
configuration outside of Japan and only the importation of the article into Japan would start the
clock running on the Dead Copy Statute. However, this is ameliorated slightly by the definition
of “keitai” (offering the configuration for sale, not only actual sales of the configuration, amounts
to the use of configuration for purposes of the UCPA). See infra Part V.A.
17. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 2-15-4, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No.
6895–96 (2005).
18. Id. art. 2-15-5.
19. See infra notes 138–42 and accompanying text.
20. Appellations of source must be well recognized for protection under Article 2-1-1 of the
UCPA and famous for protection under Article 2-1-2 of the UCPA. See Kenneth L. Port,
Japanese Trademark Dilution, 4 NW. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228, 234 (2006), available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v4/n2/5. Article 2-1-3 makes no mention of the
distinctive capacity of the product configuration.
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As such, this statutory endowment operates very much like a patent
without an application process or notice to third parties. For example, in the
Bears Club Case,21 the Osaka District Court found a towel set consisting of a
stuffed teddy bear, a towel holder, and towels, bundled together in a cute
package to be a valid product configuration.22 The court found that a nearly
identical copy of the towel set infringed the Dead Copy Statute even though
the plaintiff had not established any distinctiveness in the configuration, even
though the defendant had no specific notice of the claim, even though the
plaintiff had made no registration regarding the claimed configuration, and
even though no consumer was shown to be confused by the configuration.23
Plaintiff’s Configuration

Defendant’s Configuration

II. AMERICAN LAW
Some commentators in Japan imply that this same type of dead copy
protection is available in the United States under a “misappropriation” theory
of the common law.24 It is understood in the following terms in Japan:
Under the Common Law, there is the tort of misappropriation. To establish
this cause of action one generally needs to show the following: 1) the plaintiff
produced the thing appropriated expending much effort and money over a long
period of time; 2) the defendant used the thing appropriated at little or no cost,

21. Matsui Corporation, K.K. v. Shaday, K.K., 1659 HANREI JIHO 105 (Osaka D. Ct., June
18, 1998), translated in Kenneth L. Port, Japanese Intellectual Property Law in Translation:
Representative Cases and Commentary, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 847, 869–75 (2001).
22. Id. at 873.
23. Id.
24. See WATANABE ET AL., supra note 8, at 144.
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such that one might characterize it as “reaping where you did not sow”; and 3)
25
the plaintiff was financially damaged by the defendant’s conduct.

Although this accurately states the cause of action under the Common
Law,26 it is misleading. To be sure, there are several United States cases that
follow this theory of misappropriation and find the defendant liable;27
however, these cases are all “information” cases, not “product configuration”
cases.28 The Japanese have extended a legal theory that, in the United States,
25. Id. Interestingly enough, J. Thomas McCarthy says the following regarding the elements
of misappropriation:
(1) the plaintiff has made a substantial investment of time, effort, and money in creating
the thing misappropriated, such that the court can characterize that “thing” as a kind of
property right; (2) the defendant has appropriated the “thing” at little or no cost, such that
the court can characterize the defendant’s actions as “reaping where it has not sown”; and
(3) the defendant’s acts have injured the plaintiff, such as by direct diversion of profits
from the plaintiff to the defendant or a loss of royalties that the plaintiff charges to others
to use the thing misappropriated.
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 273
(2d ed.1995).
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (stating that “hot
news” is protected for a limited time); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F.
Supp 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (finding that defendant’s unauthorized play-by-play broadcasts of
baseball games constituted unfair competition with plaintiffs and were in violation of the
Communications Act of 1934). But c.f., NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997)
(declining to follow Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press and finding that the play-by-play
rebroadcasts of plaintiff’s games were not “hot news”).
28. Thorough discussion of the American law of product configuration is beyond the scope
of this article. Generally speaking, there are three forms of trade dress: product packaging,
product configuration and a “tertium quid.” See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S.
205 (2000). According to Wal-Mart, product configuration is only protected if it has secondary
meaning—that is, some ability to identify source in the minds of the relevant consumers. Id. at
215. Secondary meaning is not required under the Japanese Dead Copy Statute. For more on
product configuration protection in the United States and all that it entails, see Margreth Barrett,
Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on the Way
to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79, 136 (2004) (“TrafFix indicates that the policy
considerations enunciated in [Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats] should shape Lanham Act
protection for product features.”); Thomas F. Cotter, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?:
Resolving an Ostensible Conflict Between Patent Law and Federal Trademark Law, 3 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 25 (1999); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Management and Protection of Brand
Equity in Product Configurations, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 59 (1998); Paul Heald, The Worst
Intellectual Property Opinion Ever Written: Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co.:
Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Product Configurations, 5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 415 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1697 (1999) (stating that “doctrinal creep” is resulting in
the propertization of trademarks which will result in additional transaction costs to society);
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999); Stephen K. Marsh,
Patents are Forever: Construing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to Apply to Product
Configurations in Sunbeam Products, Inc v. The West Bend Co., 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 421
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is primarily used to prohibit the use of someone else’s “information” (which
may take different forms)29 and to prohibit slavishly copying someone’s
Furthermore, the common law notion of
product configuration.30
misappropriation requires that the plaintiff be financially damaged.31 There is
no such express requirement in the Dead Copy Statute.
Therefore, the Dead Copy Statute goes too far. To rely on American
misappropriation theory to justify it is just wrong. To imply that Japan’s Dead
Copy Statute can rely, in any way, on the Common Law for its justification is a
gross overstatement.
Additionally, the Dead Copy Statute would be unconstitutional if enacted
in the United States; therefore, any harmonization is impossible. The UCPA
provision fails to provide for notice of any claims arising thereunder, would
likely be void for vagueness, and would obviously be preempted by the Patent
Act and Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution (the socalled Patent and Copyright Clause).32
To be constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment
to the United States Constitution, statutes must provide sufficient notice of
claims that may arise thereunder.33 Product configuration claims in the United
(1997); Willajeane F. McLean, Opening Another Can of Worms: Protecting Product
Configuration as Trade Dress, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 119 (1997); Gary Myers, Statutory
Interpretation, Property Rights, and Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in
Trademark Dilution, Trade Dress, and Product Configuration Cases, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 241 (2000); David W. Opderbeck, An Economic Perspective on Product Configuration
Trade Dress, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 363 (2000) (“Product configuration trade dress can
provide the same economic benefits as traditional trademarks.”); Judith Beth Prowda, The
Trouble with Trade Dress Protection of Product Design, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1309 (1998); Lars
Smith, Trade Distinctiveness: Solving Scalia’s Tertium Quid Trade Dress Conundrum, 2005
MICH. ST. L. REV. 243 (2005); Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s
Functionality Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243 (2004); David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and
Patent—The Dilemma of Confusion, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 289 (1999).
29. Rex Y. Fujichaku, The Misappropriation Doctrine in Cyberspace: Protecting the
Commercial Value of “Hot News” Information, 20 HAW. L. REV. 421, 425 (1998) (arguing that
the common law of misappropriation of databases should be allowed to “wither away”).
30. See UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–96
(2005).
31. MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at 273.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see, e.g., Barrett, supra note 28; Amy B. Berge, Trade
Dress Protection: What’s Left for the States?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1055 (2000);. Margaret Chon,
Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97
(1993); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are there Limits on the
United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004); William Patry,
The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1999); Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of
the Patent Power and the Copyright Power, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 307 (2005).
33. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (stating that the essence of the Due
Process requirement is that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given the opportunity to be
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States meet this notice requirement if the configuration has secondary
meaning.34 Under the UCPA provision, distinctiveness and secondary
meaning are not required. As such, a third party will not have any notice of a
plaintiff’s claim to a configuration and the provision would lack constitutional
justification under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
The UCPA provision would also be void for vagueness if enacted in the
United States. In Bama Tomato Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,35 the
Eleventh Circuit held that a statute will be void if “it fails to afford a ‘person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he [or she] may act accordingly.’”36 Vagueness and notice are related
because if the ordinary person is not able to determine what the statute states,
then notice is lacking. In Roth v. U.S.,37 the Supreme Court stated that the
language must be clear enough to sufficiently and definitely warn of the
“proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices.”38
The UCPA provision does not warn of the proscribed conduct when
measured by a common understanding of trade practices because no one knows
which configurations fall under its vast web. This may be ameliorated
somewhat by the fact that the defendant must be shown to have both
subjectively and objectively intended to imitate.39 However, the UCPA
provision would also be inconsistent with the policy behind the Patent Act40
and the Patent and Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution.41 This
heard); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950) (explaining
that a fundamental requirement of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause is that all statutes
must give notice; notice is to be calculated on the situation of the case and in such a way that it
“reasonably conveys” all the information necessary to allow all interested parties the opportunity
to participate).
34. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (holding that product
configurations must have secondary meaning to be protected). Secondary meaning is created in a
mark through use in commerce where consumers come to think of it as an appellation of source
instead of the primary meaning of the term. Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star,
Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 1988).
35. Bama Tomato Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 112 F.3d 1542 (11th Cir. 1997).
36. Id. at 1547 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
37. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
38. Id. at 491 (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1947)).
39. See infra Part V.C.
40. Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (as amended and codified at 35 U.S.C. § 1-376
(2000)); See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting
that the policy behind the Patent Act is to create incentives for innovation); Hilton Davis Chem.
Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The patent law is directed to
the public purposes of fostering technological progress, investment in research and development,
capital formation, entrepreneurship, innovation, national strength, and international
competitiveness.”) (Newman, J., concurring).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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point was perfectly and succinctly summarized by the United States Supreme
Court in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. as follows:
The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has
expired, like “the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]—
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—
passes to the public.” The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a
“carefully crafted bargain,” under which, once the patent or copyright
monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and
without attribution. Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been
“careful to caution against misuse or over-extension” of trademark and related
protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright. “The
Lanham Act,” we have said, “does not exist to reward manufacturers for their
innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law
and its period of exclusivity.” Federal trademark law “has no necessary
relation to invention or discovery,” but rather, by preventing competitors from
copying “a source-identifying mark,” “reduces the customer’s costs of
shopping and making purchasing decisions,” and “helps assure a producer that
it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related
42
rewards associated with a desirable product.”

It is difficult to find a clearer statement of United States policy on the idea
of slavish imitation. In short, if the copyright and the patent have expired (or a
patent or copyright was never obtained), there is no right to prevent a third
party from slavishly imitating a configuration which has no source-denoting
capacity. That is, in the United States, unless a configuration is the subject of a
patent, if secondary meaning is lacking, it is dedicated to the public and anyone
can use it for any purpose.43 As such, it is hard to understand what United
States law Japan is pretending to “harmonize” when a Dead Copy Statute is
adopted under the pretext of “harmonization.”44
42. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (citations
omitted).
43. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (“Thus the
plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through false representations that those are his
wares which in fact are not, but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling.
The defendant, on the other hand, may copy the plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest
detail; but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale.”).
44. Although Japanese commentators do not recognize this, one potential justification from
American law could have been the Semi-Conductor Chip Protection Act of 1984. 17 U.S.C. §
901–14 (2000). In essence, this law prohibits the slavish imitation of another’s chip. In 1998, the
United States Congress also passed the Vessel Hull Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–32 (Supp. IV 1999).
This act, too, essentially protects boat hulls from being slavishly imitated. The Japanese literature
is silent on the relevance of these two developments, and it is a rare United States scholar who
believes this is any indication of a “trend” in the protection of “market entry industrial designs.”
See William T. Fryer, III, The Evolution of Market Entry Industrial Design Protection: An
International Comparative Analysis, 21 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. 618, 618–23 (1999). On the
other hand, the United States Congress seems prepared to continue this expansion as the Senate
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III. GERMAN LAW
The claim that Germany has a perfectly analogous cause of action to the
Dead Copy Statute is also misleading.45 Although it is true that Civil Law
jurisdictions generally are more sympathetic to the notion of protecting against
imitations without a showing of confusion,46 “‘slavish imitation’ (sklavische
Nachahmung) require[s] there to be confusion as to origin in one way or
another.”47
In Germany, imitations of another’s product that result in confusion are
prohibited (Herkunftstauschung); however, under such a theory, such use of a
product configuration must actually cause confusion and be recognized by the
public48—two significant elements that are lacking in Japan’s Dead Copy
theory. Under this German theory, technical innovations have been protected
when it is proven that they are capable of indicating origin.49
The author of the only English study I could locate concludes as follows:
German jurisdiction stresses that . . . direct adoption is not unlawful per se, but
only in certain cases because of the “special features” of the product, if
imitation is very easy (especially by electronic means, and also for databases),
when otherwise incentives for development would be stifled or when imitation
50
was undertaken systematically and for a whole range of goods.

This does not sound much like the Japanese Dead Copy statutory monopoly at
all.
Therefore, just as the reliance on the United States common law tort of
misappropriation, reliance on German law as justification for the Dead Copy
provision of the UCPA is simply unfounded.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Paris Convention was enacted in 1883 and has since provided the
basis for most international laws regarding industrial property.51 From its
inception, it has been the lynchpin of international industrial property (patents
and trademarks).
Therefore, it is of some note that, at least in the United Kingdom, the Paris
Convention has been held to not require trade dress protection for product

has recently passed a bill that makes it clear that either the hull or the deck of a boat is subject to
its provisions. S. 1785, 109th Cong. (2005).
45. See, e.g., WATANABE ET AL., supra note 8, at 143.
46. Christopher Heath, The System of Unfair Competition Prevention in Japan 121 (2001).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 122.
50. Id.
51. Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, arts. 2(1), 3, Mar. 20, 1883,
13 U.S.T. 25.
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designs.52 In Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer Products, Ltd.,
the court held that the Paris Convention did not require trade dress protection
for product designs in Article 6bis. because the drafters of the Paris
Convention could not have been thinking about product configuration when it
drafted 6bis.53 Another potential international source, and one referred to in
Japanese literature on the subject,54 is the World Intellectual Property
Organization’s so-called “Model Laws.”55 These laws are drafted from time to
time to encourage harmonization. However, it is pertinent to note that the
Model Laws apparently relied upon by the Japanese do not actually contain
any provision regarding “slavish imitation.” The Commentary to the 1996
Model Law on unfair competition reads as follows:
The Model Provisions do not contain a specific provision against so-called
“slavish imitation” because, at least for the time being, it has not been possible
to establish generally accepted conditions for such protection that would justify
56
introducing it in addition to protection by patent law.

That is, it was impossible for Japan to have accurately relied upon WIPO
Model Laws three years before it was declared that, to date, no agreement
could be reached by the member states regarding the level of protection,
independent of patent law, that product configurations should enjoy. Although
the Japanese apparently relied upon these Model Laws when enacting their
Dead Copy Statute, nothing in the Model Laws required or implied that
countries give product configuration this level of protection.
Although it did not exist in 1993, and therefore cannot be said to have had
any impact on the development of Japanese law, the European Union currently
does have a rather expansive system by which claimants of product
configuration might enjoy some protection. Although not binding on Japan in
any way because Japan is, obviously, not (yet) a member of the European
Union, the EU Design Regulation provides for the protection of product
configuration in two ways.57 First, if the configuration claimant registers the
design with the Office for Harmonization of the Internal Market (OHIM) in

52. Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer Prods., Ltd., 1998 R.P.C. 283 (Eng.
Ch.).
53. Id.
54. WATANABE ET AL., supra note 8.
55. Paul Salmon, Cooperation Between the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), 17 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 429, 431
(2003).
56. MODEL PROVISIONS ON PROTECTION OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 14 (World Intell. Prop.
Org. eds. 1996), reprinted 1997 (WIPO Publication 832(E)).
57. Council Regulation 6/2002 on Community Designs, 2002 O.J. (L3) 1 [hereinafter EU
Design Regulation]. “Design” is defined as the “appearance of the whole or a part of a product
resulting from the features of, in particular, the lines, contours, colours, shape, texture and/or
materials of the product itself and/or its ornamentation.” Id. art. 3.
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Alicante, Spain, the protection lasts for twenty-five years.58 A second
possibility, and one that sounds quite familiar, is that a configuration claimant
who does not register the design can obtain three years of protection from the
date of first sale of the product in the EU.59 The right for unregistered designs
came into effect on March 6, 2002.60
However, there is at least one significant difference between the EU
scheme and the scheme in Japan. Under the EU regime, designs are protected
only if they are new and have an “individual character.” This means that the
overall impression of the design on the informed user must create a different
impression than any prior design.61 There is no such similar requirement under
the Japanese regime. As such, it makes any analogy to the Japanese situation
obsequious.
Therefore, despite the persistent Japanese insistence that international law
requires or encourages the Dead Copy Statute level of protection from slavish
imitation, in fact, there are no actual mandatory requirements that Japan must
pass and maintain the Dead Copy Statute. Today, the EU has adopted a system
of protecting designs that is analogous to Japan’s Dead Copy Statute, but it
differs significantly in the way the protected configurations are defined.
V. JAPANESE LAW ON “DEAD COPIES”
The Japanese Dead Copy Statute is intended to provide the first
manufacturer a good lead time in the market place.62 The rationale is that there
should be a reward for expending the time, money, and effort necessary to
bring a unique product to market. It should not just be dedicated to the public
domain upon its initial sale. Some view this as gap filler because it takes up to
a year in order to obtain a registration under the Design Law. During
pendency of the Design Law application, sales can be freely made without
concern of imitation.63
In the Japanese cause of action, there are essentially six elements. These
elements are: 1) the good is a prescribed product configuration (shohin no
keitai); 2) protection lasts for three years from the date of first sale; 3) the
configuration was imitated (moho) as defined in the statute; 4) the
58. Id. art. 12.
59. Id. art. 11; see also, Dana Beldiman, Protecting the Form But Not the Function: Is U.S.
Law Ready for a New Model?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 529, 570 (2004).
60. John Richards, European Design Regime (2003), http://www.ladas.com/Patents/
PatentPractice/EUDesignRegulation/EUDesignRegime01.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
61. Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs,
available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26033.htm; Okaguchi, supra note 3, at 457.
62. See Jerry Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994).
63. YOSHIYUKI TAMURA, FUSEIKYOSOHO GAISETSU (UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW) 322–24
(2d ed. 2003) (translated by author).
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configuration is something that is commonly used with such goods; 5) the
configuration can be considered a “good” (shohin); and 6) the configuration
imitated is that of another person. 64 The configuration would be protected if
the imitation damaged the original user’s business or was likely to damage that
business.65
There is very little debate about the normative value of Dead Copy
protection, and the lack of a normative debate is odd given that Japan is rapidly
becoming an “intellectual property society.”66 That is, there is very little
debate about where the outer edge of intellectual property should lie. There is
almost no debate about the significance to the society or the economy.67
The first articulated objection to the Dead Copy Statute postulates that
sometimes courts require something more than mere slavish imitation.68
Sometimes courts require parties to show that there was specific intent to
engage in unfair competition.69 This is exemplified in a situation where the
copier is able to sell at substantially lower prices than the imitated plaintiff. By
avoiding the cost of conceptualizing and developing the configuration, the
copier saves a substantial amount of time and money. In such a case, simply
empowering the plaintiff to enjoin the copier who, by way of his conduct,
destroys the incentive that the plaintiff originally possessed to be the first on
the market. In such circumstances, an injunction ought to be sufficient to
prevent and deter infringements.70
However, this issue dances around the underlying problem without
properly identifying it. Low cost products should be rewarded. Artificial,
statutorily supported monopolies drive consumer costs up. As such, Japanese
consumers pay more for protected product configurations than, for example,
Americans who do not have to pay for protected configurations.71 Protecting
owners of configuration to this extent chills innovation by enabling owners to
rely, for three years, on a once successful product configuration that someone
64. Okaguchi, supra note 3, at 457, 469.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
67. What does exist is rather superficial. See, e.g., WATANABE ET AL., supra note 8, at 138–
39. Although preventing all copying forever would harm the incentive to innovate, using
someone’s product configuration when they made no investment in its development either in
time, money, or thought should be considered “unfair.” As such, the Dead Copy Statute creates
the appropriate balance between these two needs of society.
68. See TAMURA, supra note 63, at 301.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (“Thus the
plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through false representations that those are his
wares which in fact are not, but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling.
The defendant, on the other hand, may copy the plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest
detail; but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale.”).
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wanted to buy or copy. However, this basic inquiry remains conspicuously
absent from Japanese literature.
The next issue postulates that actual, specific, head-to-head competition in
the marketplace is not a technical requirement for protection under the Dead
Copy Statute.72 If competition were a requirement and one put a configuration
into the stream of commerce in Osaka, slavishly copying it in Tokyo would not
be actionable. Additionally, designing a licensing scheme that would account
for all of this would be extremely difficult. If party A started selling a
configuration in Tokyo, and party B started selling it in Osaka, who would
have the rights to it in Fukuoka? To be workable, the rights contemplated
under the Dead Copy Statute must be nationwide in scope, and clearly
nationwide protection is too broad.
The final concern is that services are not protected under the Dead Copy
Statute. This gap in protection can lead to some bizarre results. For example,
should someone copy the configuration of dishes used at a restaurant or
costumes worn by the service staff, which otherwise satisfy the Dead Copy
Statute, relief might be had under the Statute. But if someone slavishly
imitates the service that very same restaurant is offering, no relief can be had.
This is because product configuration, by definition, can never be a service.73
If the purpose of the law is to provide an incentive to innovation, what
possibly could be the difference between services and product configuration?
A.

“Keitai”

I translate keitai as “configuration.” This term is commonly translated as
“form”74 or “shape.”75 One way or the other, keitai as used in Article 2-1-3 of
the UCPA is defined as something far broader than either term found in any
Japanese dictionary. Keitai in the Dead Copy Statute includes not only an
item’s actual shape, but also its design, coloration, mass, and luster.76 That is,
keitai refers to a good’s overall external appearance, not just its shape.77
72. TAMURA, supra note 63, at 301 (translated by author).
73. Id. at 303 n.1.
74. THE GREAT JAPANESE DICTIONARY 654 (Tadao Umesao, et al. eds., 1989) (translated by
author).
75. KENKYUSHA’S NEW POCKET JAPANESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 520 (1964). This
translation is the common, non-legal translation.
76. TSUNEYUKI YAMAMOTO, YOSETSU FUSEIKYOSOBOSHIHO [OUTLINE OF THE UNFAIR
COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT] 136 (2002) (translated by author); see SHIGEIHIKO KANEI ET
AL., FUSEIKYOSOBOSHIHO KOMENTARU [UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION LAW AND
COMMENTARY] 61 (2004) (translated by author).
77. KANEI ET AL., supra note 76, at 61; see also K.K. Milane-Tomoda v. Lovely Queen,
K.K. (Intellectual Property High Court, Dec. 15, 2005) (a product configuration includes not only
the external appearance of a good, but also includes the configuration necessary for the
dismantling and reshaping a good), available at http://legal.lexisnexis.jp/jp/lngateway.dll?f=
templates&fn=defaultHome_JP.htm&vid=Japan:10.1048/Enu;
MINORU
TAKEDA,
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The Wire Brush Set Case78 was one of several cases which provided the
language for the change in the Dead Copy Statute in the 2005 Amendments. In
that case, the Osaka District Court determined that “product configuration”
includes a good’s shape, design, color, luster, and overall external
appearance.79 The court also found that, in addition to the actual shape and
design of the brush itself, the packaging of a hair brush set should be included
in the definition of product configuration.80
Both three-dimensional and two-dimensional product configuration are
included in this definition.81 The configuration need not give the claimant any
specific economic advantage.82 The key is that effort must have been
expended in the form of time, labor, or money in the creation of the
configuration.83
The only real restriction on the concept of “keitai” (configuration) is that it
cannot amount to the idea or concept of a configuration, only the physically
manifested configuration itself.84 Simply stated, the claimant must establish
that it is protecting the manifestation of the configuration, not the idea of the
configuration. This, at least, provides some restriction to the dead copy right.
As we will see below, this is not the only place where the dead copy right
sounds, looks, and feels like a copyright.
The Japanese government has created many “councils” to advise the Diet
on particular matters. The “Industrial Structure Council” (sangyokozo
shingikai) is one such council with a committee on intellectual property policy
(chitekizaisan seisakubuka) that has studied the matter rather closely and
reports as follows:

CHITEKIZAISANKEN SHINGAIYORON [INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] 43
(2003) (translated by author).
78. Basheen, K.K. v. Eko Metal, K.K., 1826 HANREI JIHO 132 (Osaka D. Ct., Apr. 9, 2002)
(translated by author).
79. Id.
80. Id. However, there is some academic debate as to whether packaging (hoso) alone
should be separately protected. The preponderance of opinion is that when the packaging is not
an integral portion of the overall configuration of the product, it should not be protected. See
TAMURA, supra note 63, at 298; see also J. T. Hockins, Ltd. v. Osaka Chem. Indus., K.K., 28
MUTAIZAISAN HANREISHU 140 (Osaka D. Ct., Mar. 29, 1996) (translated by author) (holding that
product configuration includes the shape, design, and color of a product, but not the container or
product explanation brochures attached to the goods, in this case sandals).
81. See KANEI ET AL., supra note 76, at 62.
82. TAMURA, supra note 63, at 298 (translated by author).
83. Id. This is yet another significant difference from either the common law tort of
misappropriation or the German notion of fair competition.
84. K.K. Sunlemon v. K.K. Oike, 1610 HANREI JIHO 112 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 27, 1997)
(translated by author) (“‘Product Configuration’ as contemplated under Article 2-1-3 of the
UCPA refers to the physical manifestation of a product. It does not include the idea or concept
behind the product.”); TAMURA, supra note 63, at 298.
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The creation of new things based on the fruit of a firstcomer’s efforts is
generally conducive to a socially healthy and long-lasting growth. Preventing
imitation is inconsistent with freedom of competition and economic growth.
On the other hand, allowing all copying defeats the incentives of the
firstcomer. Balancing the incentives provided to the firstcomer to create
socially healthy and long-lasting growth and prevent imitations is to be
determined based on the prevailing social and economic conditions. From this
point of view, in the form of attaching intellectual property rights to specific
objects, standardized restrictions are fixed in response to copying. From the
point of view of identifying specific acts of unfair competition, the Unfair
Competition Prevention Act provides for a civil system (injunctions and
damages). Through this system, fair competition is maintained. Recently,
because copying has become so much easier and the life cycle of products has
become increasingly shorter, the merit of being on the market first with any
given product has been reduced and the competition between firstcomers and
imitators has become intense. As such, the will to develop individual products
and exploit markets has been hindered. If this situation is neglected, the
competitive conditions will collapse. As such, there is a need to place “dead
85
copies” into the [scheme of intellectual property protection].

That is, this right to prevent dead copies appears to be very similar to the
right to “hot news” as set down in International News Service v. Associated
Press86 some ninety years ago, but never again really followed to the fullest
extent envisioned there.87 That is, through the definition of “keitai,” the
Japanese Diet has managed to make product configuration, whether three
dimensional or two, whether the color, shape, or even luster of the object, “hot
news” as contemplated in International News Service v. Associated Press. In
the name of harmonization, the Japanese protect the very same “sweat of the

85. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 111 (quoting SANGYO KOZO SHINGIKAI CHITEKI ZAISAN
SEISAKU BUKAI HOKOKUSHO [REPORT OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY COMMITTEE
OF THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE COUNCIL] 115 (1992)) (translated by author).
86. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
87. In fact, in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), Judge Learned
Hand, in private communications with the other judges on that panel, had the following to say
about the “hot news” doctrine:
I confess that the Associated Press Case is somewhat of a stumbling block, but I do not
believe that the five justices who united in Pitney, J.’s opinion meant to lay down a
general rule that a man is entitled to “property” in the form of whatever he makes with his
labor and money, so as to prevent others from copying it. To do so would be to shortcircuit the Patent Office and throw upon courts the winnowing out of all such designs that
might be presented. While I agree that on principle it is hard to distinguish, and that the
language applies, I cannot suppose that any principle of such far-reaching consequence
was intended. It will make patent cases an exception; it will give to State courts
jurisdiction over inventions; it will overthrow the practice of centuries.
Kenneth L. Port, Learned Hand’s Trademark Jurisprudence: Legal Positivism and the Myth of
the Prophet, 27 PAC. L. J. 221, 238 (1996).
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brow” that has long been discounted as justification for intellectual property
protection in the United States.88 The intellectual property committee of the
Industrial Structure Council was clearly aware of International News Service v.
Associated Press, but it is not clear that the Council was aware of the
subsequent ninety years of American jurisprudence on the topic of slavish
copying.89
B.

Three Years Priority

The term of protection is three calendar years to the day from the date of
first sale (saishoni hanbai saretahi).90 Therefore, if a good is “first sold” on
December 3, 1995, the term of protection would be through December 2,
1998.91 Three years was determined to be the appropriate amount of time
because the Design Law allows for six years of protection, and it was
perceived that any such Dead Copy Protection should be shorter than the
shortest existing intellectual property protection.92 The Japanese Government
commissioned a survey of the Japanese Design Protection Association to study
the life cycle of designs in Japan.93 According to the results of this survey, the
life cycle of most designs in Japan is under three years,94 and so three years
became the magic number.95
The date of first sale is interpreted very broadly. Therefore, sale in Japan
or abroad constitutes a “sale” (hanbai),96 and the sale of just one article
constitutes a sale for purposes of this statute.97 The statute does not
differentiate or discriminate against non-Japanese. In fact, even the shipping
88. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991).
89. It is axiomatic in United States jurisprudence that so long as a configuration is not
subject to patent protection and does not identify source, it may be copied without restraint. “Our
natural inclination to disapprove of such conduct must give way to the public policy favoring
competition, even by slavish copying . . . .” Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822,
824 (3rd Cir. 1981); see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir.
1995); Second Earth Enter. Inc. v. Allstar Prod. Mktg. Co., 717 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1989);
Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 622 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1985); U.S. Golf Ass’n
v. St. Andrews Sys., 219 U.S.P.Q. 143 (D.N.J. 1982).
90. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 19-5, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–
96 (2005).
91. This manner of calculation is dictated by Articles 138 and 143 of the Japanese Civil
Code.
92. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 120.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See generally TAMURA, supra note 63, at 310–13.
96. CHIKUJO KAISETSU FUSEIKYOSOBHOSHIHO [CLAUSE BY CLAUSE EXPLANATION OF THE
UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT] 53 (2005).
97. Id. at 54 n.42; see also [Parties Not Provided], 181 HANREI TIMES 83 (Osaka High Ct.,
Oct. 31, 1962) (holding that even one sale of pyrometer constituted a “sale” for purposes of the
Unfair Competition Prevention Act; this case predated the Dead Copy Statute).
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of samples would start the clock running under the theory that this is the first
date anyone could confirm the specific nature of the configuration—the date
the public would be exposed to the configuration.98 Likewise, the publication
of brochures or other pamphlets where specific products were offered for sale
would also amount to the “date of first sale,” even though no money
exchanged hands.99 The key to calculating the first sale date is to determine
when the plaintiff has commercialized (shohinka) the good.
This
100
commercialization may take many different forms.
For example, as a container for a rose-shaped chocolate for Valentine’s
Day, one company manufactured and sold a heart-shaped cup.101 A company,
Nagoya Match, K.K., ordered some 315,000 cups.102 The court held that this
order, placed with specific knowledge of what the product looked like,
commenced the running of the three-year period.103 In this case, the
defendant’s use of a very similar cup commenced within three years of the
literal sales of goods, but more than three years after this first order was
placed.104 Accordingly, the court held that the three-year period had tolled and
denied the claim for an injunction.105
Similarly, if alterations are made to the good after the first date of sale,
these alterations will not restart the clock. In the Unit Systems Case,106 the
manufacturer of a piping system for air conditioners claimed a date of first sale
in August of 1997, some five years after its original good first made it to the
market.107 The court held that the date of first sale for these revised goods was
August of 1997, but the date of the first sale of the original good was March of
1992.108 As such, not only did it predate the effectiveness date of the
amendments to the UCPA, it also far exceeded the three years of protection
afforded by the statute.109
Therefore, three years from the first sale of the configuration is to be
interpreted very broadly. The clock will commence immediately upon the
public becoming exposed to the configuration in any form, be it in specific
sales, marketing or other brochures and pamphlets, or through any kind of
98. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 118.
99. Id. at 121.
100. Id.
101. K.K. J. Seven v. K.K. Best Co., 26 MUTAIZAISAN HANREISHU 1323, 1325 (Kobe D. Ct.,
Dec. 8, 1994).
102. Id. at 1326.
103. Id. at 1330.
104. Id. at 1326.
105. Id. at 1330.
106. Kyoritsu Air Tech., K.K. v. Air Conditioning Star, K.K., 1718 HANREI JIHO 120 (Tokyo
High Ct., Feb. 17, 2000).
107. Id. at 121–22.
108. Id. at 126.
109. Id. at 129.
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advertising. It would be a rather diligent plaintiff that could take full
advantage of the full three-year period of protection.
C. Slavish Imitation (moho)
Another element of this cause of action is that a configuration actually is
imitated or copied. The Japanese use a particular word for copy or imitate:
moho. It means more than just “copied;” it means “slavish imitation.”110
Slavish imitation means using an exact replica of the configuration or an
important portion of that configuration.111 It does not merely mean “copied.”
Determining if a configuration was slavishly imitated is a factually
intensive inquiry. There must be a subjective as well as an objective intent to
slavishly imitate.112 First, there must be objective facts in the record to show
that the defendant did in fact slavishly imitate the plaintiff’s configuration.
This is satisfied if the slavish imitation is done completely (doitsu) or
substantially (jisshitsuteki).113 Therefore, even if the color of the defendant’s
product is slightly different, or the dimensions are not precisely the same, so
long as the defendant’s configuration is substantially the same as the
plaintiff’s, it will be deemed a slavish imitation.114
This is rather paradoxical. On one hand, the meaning of “moho” is to
slavishly imitate. On the other hand, a substantially similar copy will be
deemed to be a slavish imitation. This may be the definition of an oxymoron.
It is technically not possible that something is a substantially similar slavishly
imitated object. It is either slavishly imitated or it is not. There should be no
substantial similarity with which to be concerned. If that were supposed to be
the test, the Japanese Diet would have presumptively used a term other than
“moho.” They could have used a host of other terms that would allow for a
“substantial” similarity to be the test of slavish imitation, but clearly they did
not. It is equally clear that courts and commentators have grafted the notion of
substantial similarity of Dead Copies onto the Dead Copy Statute.
This ability to call substantial similar product configurations “slavish
imitations” is yet another manner in which the Dead Copy Statute might be
abused to stifle legitimate competition.
The Diet used the word “moho” for a reason. They felt that entities needed
a head start. They felt that providing this head start, would motivate entities to

110.
111.
112.
113.
1997).
114.

YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 126.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also, K.K. K. & T. v. Yasutake, 1613 HANREI JIHO 134 (Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 7,
YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 126.
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innovate. By protecting the configurations of entities for three years, it was
felt that these entities would recognize a significant incentive to innovate.115
At the same time, a balance had to be struck. If the right was too narrow, it
would chill the very innovation it was intended to promote.116 If the right was
too broad, competition would become difficult and entities would simply not
enter the game. This dilemma was the reason for using the word “moho” in the
first place. There are multiple other words that could have been used. In
Trademark Law, when referring to the concept of “similarity”, the Japanese
Diet uses the term “ruiji.” In Copyright Law, the Diet chose the term “doitsu.”
In Design Law, they chose the term “ruiji.”117 It is only in the context of the
Dead Copy Statute that the Diet elected to use the term “moho.” Presumably,
the choice is of some significance. That is, “moho” was supposed to have a
distinctive meaning for the Dead Copy Statute. To say that a configuration
that is substantially similar to another satisfies the expectations of using the
term “moho” is disingenuous at best.
One way or another, there also needs to be subjective evidence that the
defendant intended to slavishly imitate the plaintiff’s configuration. If the
defendant’s configuration is the result of the actual expenditure of time,
money, and actual innovation, it cannot be slavish imitation even if the result is
a configuration that is the same or substantially the same as the plaintiff’s.118
115. See TAMURA, supra note 63, at 301.
116. See, e.g., YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 127.
117. But cf., id. at 129–30 (noting that Takada says “doitsu” and “ruji” are the same thing).
118. K.K. Genyo v. Miyuki Technologies Yugen Kaisha, 1644 HANREI JIHO 153 (Tokyo
High Ct., Feb. 26, 1998) (finding that defendant’s key chain that was shaped as a very similar
dragon carrying a sword not did not infringe because it was nearly twice the size of the
plaintiff’s); see also K.K. Simree v. K.K. Belluna, 1822 HANREI JIHO 138 (Tokyo D. Ct., Nov.
27, 2002) (regarding the configuration of women’s clothing); K.K. Western Arms v. K.K. Anges
Seiki Hanbai, 1815 HANREI JIHO 123 (Tokyo High Ct., Jan. 31, 2002) (stating that the
configuration of air guns is protected); Yubisha Sangyo, K.K. v. Leather Products, K.K., 1770
HANREI JIHO 136 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26, 2001) (finding a small women’s shoulder bag to be
a valid product configuration and infringed); Citizen Watch, K.K. v. Yugen Kaisha Timely Bass,
1692 HANREI JIHO 129, 132 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 29, 1999) (finding that a watch face was
infringed where time was told by two rotating concentric discs rather than by a digital display or
hands).
For examples of cases where the Dead Copy Statute was determined to not be infringed,
see K.K. Basheen v. Eiko Metals, K.K., 1826 HANREI JIHO 132 (Osaka D. Ct., Apr. 9, 2003)
(finding that the configuration of defendant’s packaging and a hair brush were one and the same
and therefore appropriate subject matter for UCPA 2-1-3, but finding no infringement); K.K. IFace v. Yugen Kaisha Bit Gang, 1828 HANREI JIHO 121 (Tokyo D. Ct., Jan. 28, 2003) (denying
the protection of schedule managing software); Yugen Gaisha Harada Golf v. Citizen Mfg., K.K.,
1677 HANREI JIHO 127 (Tokyo D. Ct., Jan. 28, 1999) (finding that a golf bag was not infringed);
K.K. Sunlemon v. K.K. Oike, 1610 HANREI JIHO 112 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 27, 1997) (finding that
fasteners shaped like animals were not infringed); J.T. Hawkins, Ltd. v. Osaka Chem. Indus.,
K.K., 28 MUTAIZISAN HANREISHU 140 (Osaka D. Ct., Mar. 29, 1996) (finding that explanation
attached to a sandal was not imitated).
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In other words, as another exception, the Dead Copy Statute recognizes
However, if the
independent creation as an affirmative defense.119
configurations are nearly identical, it will be presumed that it would be
extremely unlikely that the development was truly independent, and therefore,
it may be subject to the provisions of the Dead Copy Statute.120
One of the most cited cases regarding “moho” is the Dragon Sword
Case.121 In the words of the Tokyo High Court:
“Imitation” [moho] for purposes of Article 2-1-3 of the Unfair Competition
Prevention Act means producing and offering for sale products whose
configuration is identical or substantially identical to another’s. Objectively,
this means that when viewing the products produced by another, one would
have to say that the products are the same or substantially the same.
Subjectively, this means that [the infringer] knows it is the product
configuration of another and that the product is objectively recognized as the
122
same or substantially the same as that of another.

That is, subjectively and objectively, the configurations must be identical.
Yet, the court provides some leniency when it finds that a “substantially”
identical configuration infringes just the same as an exact imitation.
In the Dragon Sword Case, the High Court reversed the lower court’s
finding of infringement.123 The product at issue was a key chain that consisted
of a sword with a dragon wrapped around it.124 The defendant’s dragon was
wrapped more times around the sword and was nearly twice the dimensions of
the plaintiff’s.125 The plaintiff’s key chain had a jewel embedded in what
would be the handle of the sword.126 The High Court found that these
differences made the defendant’s key chain not “substantially” identical to the
plaintiff’s key chain.127 The key chains are represented below. Obviously,
they are quite similar. It appears that Japanese courts are very careful when
applying the Dead Copy Statute. Perhaps they are aware of the economic
destructive capacity of the Dead Copy Statute.

By looking at this litany of cases, it is reasonable to conclude that the Dead Copy Statute
has not been a significant aspect to Japanese intellectual property protection because there are no
cases that address truly remarkable innovations. This does not mean that the potential for such
cases is not there, just that the potential has yet to be realized.
119. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 127, 129.
120. Id. at 129. As in copyright law, if access is proven, copying might be presumed. Id.
121. K.K. Genyo v. Miyuki Technologies Yugen Kaisha, 1644 HANREI JIHO 153 (Tokyo
High Ct., Feb. 26, 1998).
122. Id. at 155 (translated by author).
123. Id. at 154.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 154–55.
126. K.K. Genyo, 1644 HANREI JIHO at 155.
127. Id.
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Plaintiff’s Configuration

Defendant’s Configuration

D. Configuration Commonly Used with Such Goods
A “configuration commonly used with such goods” is viewed as an
exception to the provisions of the Dead Copy Statute.128 That is, when a
configuration consists of a good that is commonly used by others in association
with the sale of the product at hand, such a configuration will not be protected
under the Dead Copy Statute.129 There are two perceived types of exceptions
under this provision. The first is that the configuration is trite or commonplace
(arifureta).130 The other is that the configuration is functional (kinoteki).131
In a case that is sure to drastically narrow the definition of a “configuration
commonly used with such goods” and drastically expand the reach of the Dead
Copy Statute, the Intellectual Property High Court132 found the following

128. See K.K. K. & T. v. Yasutake, 1613 HANREI JIHO 134 (Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 7 1997).
129. See KANEI ET AL., supra note 76, at 71.
130. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 123.
131. Id.
132. Although it has a circuitous history, the Intellectual Property High Court was established
on April 1, 2005. See Intellectual Property High Court: History, http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/
aboutus/history.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). It is charged with hearing appeals of only
intellectual property law cases that arise out of one of the four Tokyo District Courts or two
Osaka District Courts that specialize in intellectual property law cases. See id. What amounts to
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configuration, in the form of a shirt worn by young women, to be not
functional, not trite, and therefore protectable.133
Plaintiff’s Shirt

Defendant’s Shirt

The defendant claimed that the shirt was of an inevitable design given that
it was a sleeveless top and that it was merely a combination of two different
designs that were on the market long before the plaintiff began selling shirts.134
The court stated that even though this design might be a combination of other
designs, “it cannot be said that the plaintiff’s configuration lacks
personality.”135
Additionally, the defendant argued that the configuration in question was
“trite.”136 In response to this argument, the court held:
Article 2-1-3 of the UCPA is a provision aimed at preventing the imitation of a
firstcomer’s contribution [kaihatsu rieki]. As such, the product configuration
“intellectual property” is determined by the statute under which rights are claimed in any given
case. See Intellectual Property High Court: Jurisdiction, http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/aboutus/
jurisdiction.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). If rights are claimed under any one of the
intellectual property law statutes, the case is initially heard by one of the specialized district
courts, then the specialized high court, and finally the Supreme Court. See id. For a fuller
treatment of the history of these courts by the Japanese Patent Office in English, see id. See also
John Kakinuki & Ryota Charles Goto, Getting Technical—Japan’s New Intellectual Property
High Court, 165 PATENT WORLD 15 (2004).
133. K.K. Young Fashion Research Center v. K.K. Vent International (Intellectual Prop. High
Ct., Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/chizai.nsf/Listview01/
B3DD56C8F981C672492570D00005FA55/?OpenDocument (translated by author). The court
held in favor of the original plaintiff, but awarded only 334,750 yen in damages, including
100,000 yen in attorney’s fees (approximately $2,900). See id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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protected thereunder refers to the overall product [shohinzentai] and does not
require that the configuration be novel [dokusokuteki]. Therefore, judging this
configuration considering the totality of the configuration instead of on a
piecemeal basis as the defendant argues for, it cannot be said that the
137
configuration is trite.

Trite or not, it seems that the shirt in question here is completely
functional. Functionality, for these purposes, is defined as “a configuration
chosen to inevitably or naturally realize the benefit or utility of the product.”138
However, in reasoning that might be deemed trite, the court found that the
configuration at issue here (the shape of a girl’s shirt) is not the common shape
of this good as commonly used in this industry.139 In other words, it was
possible for the defendant to compete fairly without adopting an exact copy of
the plaintiff’s design, and therefore, the design was not functional.140 That is,
where the configuration is needed to compete, the configuration is considered
functional.141 There is no room in Article 2-1-3 of the UCPA to deny
protection of a configuration based on its normative142 functionality, only its
competitive143 functionality.
Similarly in a case regarding the NuBra,144 the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant had copied the shape of its bras.145 The MAGICUPS, SWIVELIFT,
STAYKUPS, CLEARLY NATURAL and EXTREME PLUNGE were all
allegedly copied by the defendant.146 The court found no copying, but did hold

137. Id.
138. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 123.
139. K.K. Young Fashion Research Center v. K.K. Vent International, available at
http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/chizai.nsf/Listview01/B3DD56C8F981C672492570D00005FA5
5/?OpenDocument (Intellectual Prop. High Ct., Dec. 5, 2005) (translated by author).
140. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 123.
141. K.K. Young Fashion Research Center (Dec. 5, 2005).
142. For a United States case, see In re Morton-Norwich Prod., Inc., a case before the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board regarding the appropriateness of registering the Fantastic
bottle configuration. 671 F.2d 1332, 1340 (C.C.P.A 1982). The court held that competitive need
is only one element in the larger question of utility. Id.
143. It seems as if this would closely approximate the standard used today in the United
States. See Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (stating that the primary
test for determining whether a product feature is functional is whether the feature is “essential to
the use or purpose of the device or [whether] it affects the cost or quality of the device.”); see also
Sheldon W. Halpern, A High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, Traffix, Moseley and Dastar—
The Supreme Court’s New Trademark Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 237, 258
(2005).
144. Gold Flag, K.K. v. K.K. Peach John, 1927 HANREI JIHO 134 (Osaka D. Ct., Sept. 8,
2005).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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that even though the bras at issue were described in the Patent Communique,147
this alone was insufficient to render them a Configuration Commonly Used
with Such Goods.148 The court held that even though the bras were described
in various Patent Communiques, the point of Article 2-1-3 of the UCPA is to
prevent free-riding by second-comers on the innovations of the firstcomer.149
Therefore, the judgment regarding copying must be based on tangible
products.150 Mere descriptions of the products in the Patent Communique are
For the above reasons, the bras at issue were not
insufficient.151
“configurations commonly used with such goods.”152
Of course, it is important to recognize that for purposes of “first sale,” the
mere publication of the configuration in a pamphlet or sales brochure is
enough to start the clock running on the three-year period of protection.153
However, the court apparently held that these types of publications would not
be sufficiently tangible products with which comparisons could be made.154
Therefore, publications might be used to start the three-year clock running.155
Publications could not be used as a basis for comparison to determine if the
configuration is either copied or if it would fit into the exceptions and not be
protectable at all.156
In the end, this exception is satisfied and the Dead Copy Statute will not
apply if, when compared to goods of the same type, there is nothing distinctive
about the configuration and it only represents the form or function of the
configuration.157
E.

Goods (shohin)

One might think that the word “goods” (shohin) would not require a
specific definition. However, as it turns out, a definition is primarily necessary
to differentiate “goods” from “services” (yakueki), because the Dead Copy

147. A Patent Communique is an official publication of the Japanese Patent Office regarding
pending and published patent applications, available at http://www.jiii.or.jp/koho/ (translated by
author).
148. Gold Flag, K.K., 1927 HANREI JIHO 134.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See supra Part V.B.
154. Gold Flag, K.K., 1927 HANREI JIHO 134.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See K.K. Young Fashion Research Center v. K.K. Vent International (Intellectual Prop.
High Ct., Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/chizai.nsf/Listview01/
B3DD56C8F981C672492570D00005FA55/?OpenDocument (translated by author).
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Statute applies to goods, but not to services.158 Therefore, a “good” is defined
as a chattel that is put in the stream of commerce for the purpose of making a
commercial sale.159 This means that the good must be a three dimensional
product: abstract industrial property rights are not included.160 This fact did
not stop the Intellectual Property High Court from very recently finding the
headlines of newspaper articles to be “goods” for purposes of the UCPA and
granting relief based on the Civil Code.161
However, it is now rather clear that the Dead Copy Statute will not apply
to pure databases.162 This conclusion is not entirely expected. Some
commentators have argued that there is room for the Dead Copy Statute to
protect things such as databases163 or that the Dead Copy Statute should protect
databases when they are marketed on a CD or other tangible form.164 This
amounts to a significant departure from the original intent of the Dead Copy
Statute. The original intent of the Dead Copy Statute was to provide a period
of protection so that those people considering Design Law protection could be
adequately protected in the market while their design application is pending.165
This is why the Dead Copy Statute only applies to goods and not services and
why a three-year window of protection was needed (originally it took up to
three years to obtain a Design Law registration).166 As none of these
objectives are satisfied by extending Dead Copy protection to databases, it
would be unreasonable for such an extension to take place. Therefore, “good”

158. KANEI ET AL., supra note 76, at 60 (translated by author); see also TAMURA, supra note
63, at 303 n.1; Charles R. McManis, Database Protection in the Digital Information Age, 7
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 7, 20–21 (2001). But see Tsubasa System, K.K. v. K.K. System
Japan, 1774 HANREI JIHO 132 (Tokyo D. Ct., May 25, 2001) (translated by author) (finding that
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s database regarding automobiles was a tort, “an unlawful
infringement of plaintiff’s legally protected business operations,” under Article 709 of the Civil
Code and ordering defendant to pay $8 million in damages).
159. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 55 (translated by author). Regarding the definition of
“goods” for purposes of Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA, a provision closely related to the Dead Copy
Statute, see K.K. Mochisawa v. Yamanochi, 1505 HANREI JIHO 136 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 24,
1993); Ito v. K.K. Kyobashi Iwada Bokei, 1057 HANREI JIHO 43 (Tokyo High Ct., Apr. 28,
1982).
160. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 55.
161. Yomiuri Newspaper v. Digital Alliance (Intellectual Prop. High Ct., Oct. 6, 2005)
(relying, however, on Article 709 of the Civil Code to support an injunction and damages),
available at http://legal.lexisnexis.jp/jp/lngateway.dll?f=templates&fn=defaultHome_JP.htm&
vid=Japan:10.1048/Enu.
162. That is, databases that lack originality.
163. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 117.
164. McManis, supra note 158, at 21.
165. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
166. This, at least, is the common wisdom. At least since 2002, the pendency period for
Design Law applications has been 8 months. See JPO Annual Report 2005, available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/toushin_e/kenkyukai_e/pdf/ar2005/ar2005_part05.pdf.
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as used in the Dead Copy Statute should mean three-dimensional goods or
two-dimensional designs for actual products.
F.

Configuration of Another Person

The words “competition” (kyoso) and “confusion” (kondo) are
conspicuously absent from the Dead Copy Statute. In fact, even the word
“intent” (ito) is nowhere to be found in the Dead Copy Statute.167 This would
imply that they are irrelevant.
In other portions of the UCPA, such as Articles 2-1-1 and 2-1-2, which
immediately precede the Dead Copy Statute, these terms are included (except
for “intent”). Since they are absent from the Dead Copy Statute, normal
statutory construction would also imply that they are irrelevant—that the Dead
Copy Statute could be applied to competitors or non-competitors equally,
irregardless of an intent to imitate or deceive.
Although competition is presumed to be a requisite element of each
provision in the UCPA,168 the only literal intimation that exists in the language
of the Dead Copy Statute itself is the use of the term “tanin no” (another
person’s) configuration.169 Accordingly, the literal language of the Dead Copy
Statute would permit its use against non-competitors. However, because the
statute refers to the configuration “of another person,” it impliedly relates only
to competitors.170 Of course, this taxes the imagination a bit. One can easily
envision “another person” with whom there is no competition. However, if
one slavishly imitates the product of another, then presumably the target
market for that product would be the same or similar to that of the original
product. This, however, is not expressly stated and is only presumed by the
Diet.
Regardless of the clear statutory omission, “another person” has been
limited by Japanese courts to mean “the person who develops a product,
commercializes it, and places it in the stream of commerce.”171 The imitator
would presumably be in competition with the original, thus necessitating the
imitation.
The requirement of competition should be clearly stated in the statute. The
statute should be further amended to make it clear that the Dead Copy Statute
should only apply in competitive situations. Failing to limit the Dead Copy
167. However, as noted in the material regarding imitation, intent is a judicially created
requirement. See TAMURA, supra note 63, at 301.
168. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 55.
169. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 2-1-3, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–
96 (2005).
170. Id.
171. Kono, K.K. v. Teihara, 1760 HANREI JIHO 138 (Tokyo D. Ct., Aug. 31, 2001) (translated
by author); see also Basheen, K.K. v. Eko Metal, K.K., 1826 HANREI JIHO 132 (Osaka D. Ct.,
Apr. 9, 2002).
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Statute to truly competitive situations potentially broadens the statute far
beyond what was originally intended. If a three-year window is needed to give
entities a leg up in the marketplace or a head start over their competition, then
there seems to be a specific need to make certain that the parties are in
competition in the first place. If there is no competition, one of the basic
foundations of the Dead Copy Statute is not met and therefore no cause of
action should arise.
VI. ANOTHER BITE OUT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
It is now pretty well established that trademark or trademark-like
monopolies are not positive things for an economy.172 The Dead Copy Statute
establishes an unnatural, statutory monopoly for a period of three years.173 We
generally believe that all of intellectual property is an artificial monopoly.174 If
intellectual property assets were priced at marginal cost, return on investment
would never be realized because the cost of creation is so high.175 Therefore,
governments create artificial monopolies to encourage innovation.176 That is,
the Dead Copy Statute will result in a monopoly control over each individual
configuration, causing demand for that configuration to drop as prices for that
configuration rise.177 Free competition is the major loser with the Dead Copy
Statute.
The Dead Copy Statute appears in the UCPA, but it really acts entirely as a
sui generis law because it has no association with appellations of source or
distinctiveness of any kind and it cannot be said to act like anything related to
the Trademark Law,178 Unfair Competition Law,179 or intellectual property law
172. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor’s New Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does
Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (2000); Lunney, supra note 28.
173. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 19-5, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–
96 (2005).
174. Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 39 (2005).
175. Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 368–
69 (2002).
176. Id.
177. Lunney, supra note 28, at 367–68.
178. See Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996, art. 1 (“By protecting trademarks, this law
aims to maintain the goodwill of the businesses of trademark users and thereby to contribute to
the growth and development of business and to protect the interest of the consumer.”). Granting
rights to prevent the slavish imitation of configuration that has no source denoting function does
not meet this explicit objective of the Trademark Law. See KENNETH L. PORT, JAPANESE
TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE 26 (1998).
179. See UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 1, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–
96 (2005) (“The objective of this law is to contribute to the robust development of the Japanese
national economy by preventing unfair competition and providing damages to aggrieved parties
therefrom in order that fair competition among entrepreneurs be maintained and Japan’s
commitment to international agreements regarding unfair competition are observed.”). Providing
mini-monopolies for three years to the first party who places a product configuration into the
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in general.180 As competition is only a presumed element of the cause of
action, it cannot be said that it is directly related to “unfair” competition either.
As such, it is best conceptualized as a stand alone, sui generis law.
This cannot be good for the Japanese economy. Removing all product
design from the marketplace of ideas for three years after the initial sale of that
article will lead to less competition and unnatural higher prices. At a time
when the Japanese economy is fragile at best,181 this cannot have overall
positive results for the Japanese economy.
It is axiomatic in intellectual property law that as monopoly or monopolylike rights expand, rents go up and competition goes down.182 The Japanese
see this as an effective trade-off to encourage innovation. They see it as a gapfiller so that those creators of works that will ultimately be protected by the
Design Law can be protected while their Design Law application is pending.
However, there is a flaw in the Japanese rationale for the Dead Copy
Statute. For a period of three years, the first user of a configuration is granted
the right to charge monopoly rents regarding that configuration. During this
monopoly period, an intelligent or sophisticated user will take advantage of
that three-year period to add a source denoting function to the configuration.183
Once that source denoting function is added to the trade dress, it will become

stream of commerce with no explicit requirement that there be any competition and with no
requirements that there be any notice, registration or distinctiveness does not contribute to the
“robust development” of the Japanese economy.
180. Mitsuo Matsushita, A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual Property Rights and the
GATT, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 86 (1992).
181. From the 1950s until the 1970s, great prosperity was recognized in Japan. Mitsuru
Misawa, Laws and Regulations on Problem Loans in Japan: Is Application of International
Accounting Standards Possible?, 18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2–5 (2004). In the 1970s, stagnation
set in. Id. By 1980, the attempts to revive the economy resulted in a “bubble” economy where
land was grossly overvalued. Id. By 1990, land prices dropped drastically. Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition,
Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 451–53 (2002). In some places in
Tokyo, land dropped 50% in value in a few years. Id. This was a problem because Japanese
banks had secured massive amounts of loans with real estate that was now worth far less then
when the loans were made. Id. at 451–52. The result was that Japanese banks were left holding
massive amounts of nonperforming loans and had no new capital to lend. Id. at 452. In most
countries, this would result in bread lines. However, the Japanese engaged in wholesale reforms
to overcome this great economic as well as social crisis.
182. Ernesto M. Hizon, Virtual Reality and Reality: The East Asian NICs and the Global
Trading System, 5 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 81, 140 (1999).
183. Technically, because use is not required for a trademark registration in Japan, one could
even file the trademark application prior to a mark having a source denoting function; however,
this is rather unlikely. Once the configuration comes to represent the first comer in the market
place, a trademark application would likely be filed. The configuration owner is thus granted a
three-year head start on its attempts to create a strong trademark capable of sustaining an attack.
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appropriate subject matter for a regular trademark registration.184 Once
registered, that first user of the configuration, now the owner of a broad
Japanese trademark registration, will have the ability to exclude all others from
using that configuration on confusingly similar goods (not just slavishly
imitated goods) for as long as that first user maintains the registration.185
Under the Japanese regime, one can obtain rights in classifications of goods
where no use is made.186 Although any such registration is subject to
cancellation if it is not used for a period of three years,187 it is quite common
for Japanese competitors to broadly register under a variety of classifications
where no use is had or is expected so that the unsuspecting second comer
becomes technically liable for infringing the very mark it had been using. This
could very well be in perpetuity.188
Additionally, a Japanese trademark registration itself is far stronger and
much less susceptible to challenge than a registration in the United States.189
Therefore, this trademark registration is a very broad property right.190 That is,
what begins as an innocent, three-year head start (to encourage innovation of
configurations and to allow for configurations to be used and not kept secret
while the Design Law application is pending) can easily transform into a broad
monopoly of indefinite duration. This cannot be a positive thing for the fragile
Japanese economy.

184. Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996, arts. 2-1, 3, 4. The Japanese actually refer to trade
dress registrations as “ritai shohyo” or three dimensional marks. The Japanese Patent Office
keeps no statistics as to how many three dimensional marks might be registered. To be sure, it is
not an insignificant amount.
185. Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996, arts. 37, 25 (“The registrant possesses the
exclusive right to use the registered trademark on or in connection with the Identified Goods or
Services.”).
186. Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996, art. 18 (“The trademark right shall subsist upon
registration of the trademark application.”); Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996, art. 8
(providing that the first in time to file the application will be deemed the “Applicant”). And, of
course, the Trademark Law extends to the protection of service marks. See PORT, supra note 178,
at 26 (explaining that the Japanese trademark law does not define services but rather allows for
marks to be registered as used on or in connection with services); see also SHOEN ONO,
SHOHYOHOGAISASTU [EXPLANATION OF TRADEMARK LAW] 159 (1999).
187. Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996, art. 50-1.
188. Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996, art. 19 (providing that trademarks are renewable
in ten year terms without limitation). Because the right to register product configuration is quite
new, starting in 1997, a very limited number of registrations for product configurations have been
registered.
189. PORT, supra note 178, at 112.
190. See id. at 75–79 (reviewing cases regarding the protection of three dimensional
trademarks under Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA and concluding that “the possibilities for protection
seem nearly endless”).
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More importantly, the Trademark Law was amended, effective April 1,
1997.191 With this amendment, for the first time, configurations were
recognized as possible trademarks. For the first time, three-dimensional trade
dress became appropriate subject matter for registration as a trademark. Even
if the justification was accurate for the Dead Copy Statute in 1993 (and I argue
that it was not), it is, to be sure, no longer accurate post-April 1, 1997. Today,
product configuration is protectable as a trademark, registrable as a trademark,
and can be protected to the full extent of trademark law.192
The Dead Copy Statute was drafted in 1993, some three years before the
amendments to the Trademark Law were drafted.193 At that time, product
configurations were only protected if they had become well-known “Good[s]
or other Appellation[s]” under the old Unfair Competition Prevention Act.194
If they failed to qualify as well-known, there was no protection.
Between 1993 and 1997, the Dead Copy Statute was the only means by
which one might protect product configuration that was not a well-known
appellation of source. Today, one merely needs to register that configuration
as a trademark and take full advantage of the Trademark Law. There is really
no longer any need for the Dead Copy Statute and it ought to be repealed.
VII. THE NEW MORAL RIGHT
The Dead Copy Statute in Japan operates like moral rights under the Civil
Law System. Many Civil Law countries protect moral rights.195 Moral rights
generally include the right of attribution, the right of integrity, and the right of
withdrawal.196 These rights are usually inalienable197 and are usually reserved
for the individual,198 not the corporation.199 In Japan, however, the notion that

191. Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996.
192. Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996, art. 4-1-18.
193. Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996.
194. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 2, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–96
(2005).
195. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 97, 98 (1985) (claiming that in 1985 there were 35 countries that
protected the moral right). Moral rights are given statutory protection under the Copyright Law.
See CHOSAKUKENHO [COPYRIGHT LAW], Law No. 48 of 1970, arts. 59–60.
196. MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at 280.
197. Adolf Dietz, Alai Congress: Antwerp 1993 The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights
and the Civil Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 207 (1995).
198. 1 JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 145
(2d ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 1987) (“The primary justification for the protection of moral rights is
the idea that the work of art is an extension of the artist’s personality, an expression of his most
innermost being.”).
199. This article is not intended to be a dispositive dissertation on moral rights. For a general
discussion of moral rights, see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 8D.01[A] (2006); MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT 376-80

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

“DEAD COPIES”

125

moral rights are somehow reserved for individuals seems to go
unrecognized.200 The hurdle of maintaining moral rights as personal rights has
been long crossed. As such, the notion of creating rights that look and feel like
moral rights and where a corporation is the principle benefactor is not a
conceptually difficult task. Because moral rights are already exercised by
corporations, creating one more right for the benefit of corporations is not a
hard stretch to make.
Therefore, the best way to understand the Dead Copy Statute in Japan is to
perceive of it as a moral right that corporations enjoy. As it is not one of the
generally enumerated moral rights, to me, this is a “new moral right.” To
pretend this has to do with unfair competition is misleading, to say the least.
The Dead Copy Statute operates like a moral right because it seems to
protect the personality of the corporation. The corporation mingles itself with
the product configuration and therefore, on a natural rights sort of orientation,
is protected regardless of any source denoting capacity of the configuration.
That is, the corporate “self”201 is extended to include any and all configurations
which the corporation is the first to put into the stream of commerce (and
which are not functional, etc.).
Therefore, the Dead Copy Statute creates a moral right that is capable of
being exercised by the corporate owner of the relevant configuration. This
may give other benefits to the corporation (such as a head start in creating
trademark protection), but that is all ancillary to the mere fact of the protection
of the configuration. The Japanese believe that the personality of the
corporation, in the form of the configuration, must be protected to encourage
innovation. Although this is the justification that is given, it is entirely
unpersuasive. A more persuasive argument is that the personality of the
corporation needs to be protected as a natural right and the best way to
accomplish this is by protecting manifestations of the corporate self in the form
of the configurations it places into the stream of commerce.
CONCLUSION
The Japanese Dead Copy Statute goes too far. It attempts to protect the
developers of product configuration for three years from the date of first sale,
(4th ed. 2005); David B. Jordan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Domestic Intellectual Property
Law and Native American Economic and Cultural Policy: Can it Fit?, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 93
(2001); EIlhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
795 (2001); Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Moral Right and Moral Righteousness, 1 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 65 (1997).
200. See, e.g., Konami, K.K. v. Ichiro Komami, 1696 HANREI JIHO 145 (Tokyo D. Ct., Aug.
30, 1999).
201. Although regarding individuals and not corporations, this argument is made by Arthur
Katz. See Arthur S. Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law—A
Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 401 (1951).
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but because there is no requirement that the configuration be distinctive, that
registration be had, that notice be given, or that confusion be proved, it
operates as a sui generis monopoly on product configurations. The Japanese
claim that the Dead Copy Statute is somehow justified or necessary because of
German, American, and even international law. However, these claims are
spurious because there is no such broad requirement in any of these enacted
laws. Therefore, the claim that the Dead Copy Statute is necessary for
harmonization is also erroneous. In fact, the mere existence of the Dead Copy
Statute makes harmonization very difficult.
Dead Copy protection in the United States would be unconstitutional. It
goes against the most basic concepts of free and open competition. It flies in
the face of the basic American notion that anything not protected by copyright,
patent, or trademark is free for all to copy.
There is a fundamental difference between the United States and Japan
(and perhaps other countries) in the manner in which each country
conceptualizes the need to protect the developer of some configuration in order
to encourage them to produce more. In the United States, we call this a patent;
in Japan, they call it a monopoly.
The Dead Copy Statute is justified by the Japanese on the ground that it
improves innovation. However, it has been shown that the nature of the
configurations protected are not innovative, creative, or even all that
interesting. If innovation were being encouraged by the Dead Copy Statute,
one would expect the configurations to represent that. In fact, the Dead Copy
Statute is merely being used as another method to further the competitive goals
of individual corporations.
The only acceptable explanation of the Dead Copy Statute is that it
operates as a personal right, much like the moral right in Civil Law legal
systems. Of course, the huge distinction is that this personal right is also
available to corporations and in every society other than Japan, moral rights are
enjoyed only by individuals, not corporations. Strict liability attaches to
violations of this right just like strict liability applies to violations of the moral
right. As the Dead Copy Statute is inconsistent with economic realities and the
Trademark Law now provides protection for product configurations, the Dead
Copy Statute ought to be repealed.

